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Article 5

Not a Free Press Court?
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky *
I. INTRODUCTION

The last decade has been tumultuous for print and broadcast media.
Daily newspaper circulation continues to fall precipitously, magazines
struggle to survive, and network television audiences keep shrinking. 1
On the other hand, cable news is prospering, mobile devices such as
iPads and smart phones are "adding to people's news consumption," 2
and many "new media" outlets appear to be thriving. 3 Despite the
dynamism in the media industry, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
John Roberts has taken up relatively few First Amendment cases directly
involving the media. 4 The Court has addressed a number of important

* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. The
author thanks Kathryn Bennett, Theodore Randles, and Andrea Pinzon Garcia for research and
editing assistance. Special thanks go to RonNel! Anderson Jones for organizing the excellent
symposium that was the genesis of this essay and to the editors of the Brigham Young University
Law Review for their editorial assistance and patience. The author also thanks Lisa McElroy and
David Anderson for reading earlier drafts of this essay at the eleventh hour. Any remaining errors
are the author's, unfortunately.
I. See Amy Mitchell & Tom Rosenstiel, Pew Research Ctr.'s Project for Excellence in
Journalism, The State of" the News Media 2012: Overview, STATEOFTHEMEDIA.ORG (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://stateofthemedia.org 20 12/overview-4.
2. !d.
3. ld

4. It is unclear how many certiorari petitions involving the media the Roberts Court has
denied. Based on my survey of the Roberts Court's cases involving the First Amendment, I
determined that the only cases directly involving the media are FCC v. Fox Televisions Stations, Inc.
(Fox[), 556 U.S. 502 (2009), and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox 11). 132 S. Ct. 2307
(2012), which ended up being decided on administrative-law and due-process grounds respectively,
and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (20 II). I discuss in the text of this
essay what I consider the most significant Roberts Court decisions that indirectly implicate media
interests, including United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct.
1207 (2011 ), United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), and Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010). The Roberts Court has also heard several cases that implicate issues of concern to
the mainstream media, including the ability to cover criminal trials, to ohtain access to public
documents, and to cover public officials. Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010), for example,
was not a press case, or even a First Amendment case; but it has direct implications for press
coverage of trials. In Presley, the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion held that a criminal
defendant's "Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors."
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free speech cases since 2005, but thus far the only Roberts Court
decisions directly involving the traditional media are the two rulings in
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 5 both of which avoided the looming
First Amendment issue they contained, and the only decision involving
"new media" is Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n. 6 Media
lawyers, therefore, are still trying to gain insight into how the Roberts
Court envisions the role of the institutional press and whether existing
constitutional protections for the press might be eroded or strengthened
in coming terms.
This essay, taking its cue from Erwin Chemerinsky's recent lecture,
Not a Free Speech Court, 7 attempts to read the jurisprudential tea leaves
to determine what lines of argument the media might use and how they
might fare in future cases before the Roberts Court. Though the evidence

/d. at 724. The Court found this result to be clearly dictated by its prior decisions holding that
criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to public suppression hearings and that the public
has a First Amendment right to attend voir dire examination in criminal trials. !d. at 723. The
Supreme Court reminded the lower court that "[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable
measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials." !d. at 725.
Another case that was a not-strictly-speaking press case also has implications for press access
to government information. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811,2815 (2010). involved a Washington state
referendum procedure, which allowed citizens to call a referendum vote on any bill passed by the
legislature when a specified percentage of Washington voters signed a petition to do so. Opponents
of same-sex marriage used the referendum procedure to attempt to reverse a state law known as the
"everything but marriage" act. /d. at 2816. When proponents of same-sex-marriage rights sought
access to the signed petitions under the Washington Public Records Act, two of the petition signers
and a group called Protect Marriage Washington invoked their First Amendment rights and sought a
preliminary injunction against disclosure. !d. The Court held that compelled disclosure of the names
of those who signed petitions in a referendum context was constitutional, but left open the possibility
that compelled disclosure might violate the First Amendment if disclosure would expose petition
signers to harm. !d. at 2821.
Finally, the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), has
tremendous significance for copyright owners, publishers, and users because it permits millions of
foreign works published after 1923 to be removed from the public domain and signals the Court's
reluctance to impose First Amendment limitations on legislative expansion of copyrights. !d. at 900.
The Golan decision allowed Congress to "restore[]'' copyright protection to foreign works already
within the public domain. !d. at 878. The Court rejected the argument that the restoration of works
within the public domain to copyright protection violated the First Amendment, finding the relevant
interest to be adequately protected by the doctrine of fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy in
copyright law. /d. at 890. Justices Breyer and Alito, in dissent, argued that the Court's opinion gave
short shrift to the First Amendment interests of U.S. audiences and did not serve copyright's
traditional purpose of promoting the creation of new works.ld. at 907-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. See Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307; Fox I, 556 U.S. 502.
6. Entm 't Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729.
7. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723 (20 II).
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is scanty, a number of patterns emerge from the Roberts Court's First
Amendment decisions thus far, some which appear to be good for the
media and some less positive. The good news is that the Roberts Court
appears committed to protecting unpopular speech, 8 limiting the spread
of "medium-specific" First Amendment doctrines to new media, 9 and
broadly defining speech of public concern. 10 The bad news, at least for
broadcasters, is that the Roberts Court is not yet ready to free them from
the FCC's content-based regulatory oversight, 11 and the worst news for
all media is that the Court appears to see the "Fourth Estate" as little
more than a self-serving slogan bandied about by media corporations. 12
II. PROTECTING UNPOPULAR SPEECH

The media can take heart from the strength of the Roberts Court's
commitment to protecting unpopular speech, though famed First
Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams is waxing hyperbolic when he
asserts that "no prior Supreme Court has been as protective as [the
Roberts Court]" 13 in protecting unpopular speech. Abrams bases his
assertion, no doubt, on decisions like Snyder v. Phelps, 14 which upheld
the rights of the Westboro Baptist Church to protest at military funerals
despite the pain inflicted on military families, 15 and United States v.
Stevens, 16 which struck down a federal statute making it a crime to
distribute videos depicting the illegal killing, wounding, or torture of
animals. 17 Both Snyder 18 and Stevens affirm that the government may

8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part Ill.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Part VI.
13. Adam Liptak, Study Challenges Supreme Court's Image as Defender of Free Speech,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, at A25 (emphasis added).
14. Snyderv. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
15. !d. at 1219.
16. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
17. !d. at 1592. The Stevens case involved prosecution of a producer of dogfighting videos
who did not himself participate in dogfights. !d. at 1583. He was prosecuted under a 1999 federal
law that banned trafficking "depictions of animal cruelty," which Congress defined to include
killings that violated federal or state law. !d. at 1582-84. The Court suggested that a statute "limited
to crush videos [that is, sexual-fetish videos in which women in high heels crush small animals to
death J or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty" might be constitutional, but that the statute in
question was overbroad because it reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech,
id. at 1592, including "hunting-related" videos, magazines, television programs, and websites, id. at
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not suppress distasteful speech, even when most citizens find it morally
reprehensible and it offers little social value.
Though Stevens might be chalked up to Congress's sloppy drafting,
the Court in United States v. Alvarez reaffirmed that the First
Amendment protects even "speech we detest." 19 Alvarez struck down a
federal statute making it a crime for a person to falsely claim that she
received a military decoration or medal authorized by Congress. 20
Though the Alvarez Court was divided, 21 the decision affirmed that the
government lacks the power to censor lies-even lies that offend
patriotic values-absent a showing of significant harm. 22 Although most
would hope that the media do not need protection for outright lies, the
Court's decision is a comforting signal that the Roberts Court will
protect unpopular speakers, regardless of their ideology.

1589. Congress subsequently passed a narrower statute, the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of
2010, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2012), which defines "animal crush video":
any photograph, motion-picture film, video or digital recording, or electronic image that
(I) depicts actual conduct in which I or more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles,
or amphibians is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or
otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 and including
conduct that, if committed against a person and in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, would violate section 2241 or 2242); and (2) is obscene.

!d.
18. See discussion of Snyder, infra Part IV.
19. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (20 12) (plurality opinion).
20. !d. at 2542-43.
21. !d. at 2541. The Court held that the Stolen Valor Act was facially unconstitutional, with
six Justices concluding that false statements are not "in a general category that is presumptively
unprotected." !d. at 2546-4 7. The Justices split on the constitutional standard that governed the
outcome. The Court's plurality opinion, joined by four Justices, applied strict or "exacting" scrutiny
to the Act as a content-based restriction on speech. !d. at 2543. Although "[t]he Government's
interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question," the government could
not show the Act was "actually necessary" to achieve that interest. !d. at 2549. The government
showed no evidence that lies about military awards would dilute their meaning, and "counterspeech"
can easily be deployed against false claims. !d. Moreover, "[a] Government-created database" listing
soldiers who received medals or honors was a less restrictive alternative to criminalization of speech.
!d. at 2551. The two Justices who joined the plurality in invalidating the Act differed as to the
appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny of restrictions on false speech such as lies about military
honors: they applied "intermediate scrutiny" or "proportionality" analysis and determined that the
Act's harms to speech interest were "disproportionate" to its advancement of the government's
interest in upholding the integrity of its military awards. !d. at 2551, 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring).
22. Even the dissenting Justices acknowledged that "there are broad areas in which any
attempt by the state to penalize purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable
danger of suppressing truthful speech." !d. at 2564 (A lito, J., dissenting).
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Ill. NO EXTENSION OF "MEDIUM-SPECIFIC" REGULATION

The principle that the government may not regulate speech because it
offends many, or even most, citizens may be especially beneficial to
"new media." The Court expressed its willingness to extend the principle
to them 23 in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n. 24 Entertainment
Merchants Ass 'n involved a constitutional challenge to a statute
prohibiting sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. 25 The state
of California argued that the "interactive" 26 nature of violent video
games justified restricting them from minors and provided media effects
research purportedly showing that interactive or immersive media
experiences can lead to harm. 27 The Court, however, rejected the
argument that "medium-specific" characteristics of video games justified
either relaxing First Amendment prohibitions on content-based
regulation of speech or creating a new category of unprotected speech.
Although the Court believed that video games serve First Amendment
purposes 28 only fitfully, if at all, it nonetheless gave them full First
Amendment protection, stating, "[W]e have long recognized that it is
difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to
try." 29 The Court found no constitutionally relevant distinction between
video games and the "books, plays, and movies that preceded them." 30
Like these older media, video games also "communicate ideas-and
even social messages-through many familiar literary devices" as well
as "through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's
23. See Robert Com-Revere, Moral Panics, the First Amendment, and the Limits of Social
Science, 28 COMM. LAW. 4, 4 (2011) (noting that the case involved "new communications
technologies").
24. Brownv. Entm'tMerchs.Ass'n, 131 S.Ct.2729(2011).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE§§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2009), invalidated by Entm 't Merch.1·. Ass 'n, 131
S. Ct. 2729. The statute made violations punishable by civil fines of up to $1,000, and defined
violent video games as those which (a) involve a player "killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting an image of a human being," but only when such depiction (b) "appeals to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors," (c) is "patently offensive" for minors based on "prevailing
community standards," and (d) the game as a whole lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors." CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1746(d)(l)(A), 1746.3, invalidated by Entm 't
Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729.
26. Entm 't Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2737-38.
27. !d at 2768-70.
28. According to the Court, the First Amendment's Speech Clause exists primarily "to
protect discourse on public matters." !d. at 2733.
29. !d.
30. !d.
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interaction with the virtual world)." 31 The Court acknowledged "the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology," 32
but nonetheless affirmed what it referred to as the "most basic" First
Amendment principle: government may not impose content-based
limitations on expression except in the handful of "well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. " 33
The Court noted that throughout American history, critics have accused
new entertainment forms and technologies enjoyed by minors of having
pernicious effects, and it portrayed California's concern about video
games as simply another misguided and moralistic attempt to censor
children's media consumption. 34 The Court's suspicion of attempts to
draw constitutional distinctions between new media and old should, on
balance, benefit most media actors. However, those wishing to justify
special constitutional protections for the institutional media based on
their special role in checking governmental abuses of power should note
that the Court's unwillingness to draw lines between entertainment and
news media suggests it might not be receptive to such arguments.

31. !d.
32. !d.
33. !d. at 2735-37. In addition to refusing to apply medium-specific First Amendment
principles to video games, the Court also refused to expand the categories of unprotected speech
simply because the violent video games were "directed at children." !d. at 2731. In Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), the Supreme Court expressed in dicta its unwillingness to create new
medium-specific doctrines as follows: "We must decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutional
lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from a
particular speaker." !d. at 891.
34. Ultimately, the Court declared the video game legislation unconstitutional because
California had failed to "show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to
minors." Entm 't Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738. The media-effects research on which California
relied was methodologically unsound. Moreover, if violent entertainment does harm children, there
is no valid reason for "singl[ing] out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment" relative
to, say, cartoonists or to allow minors access to such "dangerous, mind-altering material" on the sayso of a parent "or even an aunt or uncle." !d. at 2740. The Court found the legislation particularly
unnecessary in light of the evidence on the record that the video-game industry already performed a
great deal of self-policing by voluntarily refusing to sell to minors video games (voluntarily) labeled
as appropriate only for mature audiences. The Court also found the legislation overinclusive to the
extent it attempted to assist parents in controlling their children's access to violent fare, since it
prevented access even by those children whose parents did not care whether they purchased such
fare.
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IV. MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN BROADLY DEFINED

The Roberts Court decision in the "free speech" case of Snyder v.
Phelps is likely to be an unmitigated boon to media defendants litigating
tort cases 35 in years to come. In Snyder, the Court took a broad view of
what types of speech involve "matters of public concern," and thereby
deserve enhanced First Amendment protections in tort cases. 36 Snyder
involved a fringe religious group that protested at the funeral of a U.S.
Marine killed in action in Iraq; the group sought to publicize its view that
dead soldiers are America's punishment for tolerating homosexuality. 37
The soldier's father saw the protest on television later that evening and
eventually sued and won substantial damages at trial for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 38 intrusion, and civil conspiracy. 39
Despite the sympathetic plaintiff and despicable speech involved in
the case, the Roberts Court held that the First Amendment shielded the
speakers from tort liability because their speech touched a "matter of
public concem." 40 The Court recognized that this inquiry was often

35. The determination of whether speech is of public or merely private concern has a
significant effect on plaintiffs suing the media in cases involving defamation, invasion of privacy, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Public officials and public figures who sue for
defamation must prove actual malice. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public
figures); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials). In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court held that private-figure plaintiffs must prove at
least negligence in order to recover for defamation and must prove actual malice to receive
presumed or punitive damages. The Court's later decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), clarified that the constitutional fault standards announced in
Gertz apply only in cases involving allegedly defamatory speech on matters of public concern. The
First Amendment does not prohibit private-figure defamation plaintiffs suing on matters of only
private concern from recovering presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual
malice. Indeed, the reasoning of Dun & Bradstreet suggested that states may impose strict liability
on defendants who defame private-figure plaintiffs regarding matters of private concern. See
generally LYRISSA LIDSKY & ROBERT G. WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 63-104 (2004). Whether speech is of public or merely
private concern matters greatly in determining what a plaintiff must prove to recover against the
media for invasions of privacy or for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Fla. Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987); Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491 (1975).
36. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1207 (20 II).
37. /d.atl213.
38. !d. at 1213-14. At trial, the father testified he was unable to separate thoughts of his son
from the picketing, and experts attested that the father was suffering from severe depression that
exacerbated his existing health problems. !d. at 1214.
39. !d. at 1214. A panel of the Fourth Circuit subsequently reversed the trial court. !d.
40. /d.atl219.
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outcome-determinative, 41 and its decision emphasized that "public
concern" must be broadly defined: the Court conducted an "independent
examination" of the "content, form, and context" of the speech to
determine that it qualified for protection. 42 As to content, the signs
expressed views on "the political and moral conduct of the United States
and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and
scandals involving the Catholic clergy." 43 The context was a public
protest, albeit outside a funeral, 44 and because the picketers were
peaceful demonstrators on public property who caused no disruption,
they were acting within their First Amendment rights, even though they
exploited the funeral as a tactic to gain publicity. The Court therefore set
aside the jury verdict against them, though emphasizing that its holding
was "narrow" and "limited by the particular facts." 45

V. MEDIUM-SPECIFIC BROADCAST REGULATIONS REMAIN INTACT, FOR

Now
When surveying the Roberts Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, those who care about media issues must take the bitter
with the sweet. What might have been the most significant media law
case before the Supreme Court in recent memory is FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. 46 The Fox case, which made its way to the

41. !d. at 1211. The Court stated, "[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding
Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private
concern." !d. at 1215. In doing so, the Court cited Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749 ( 1985), which exempted defamatory speech on matters of purely private concern
from the constitutional strictures that protect defamatory speech on matters of public concern, and
Connick v. Myers. 461 U.S. 138 (1983), which limited government employers' power to discipline
their employees for speech on matters of public concern.
42. More specifically, the Court "evaluate[ d] all the circumstances of the speech, including
what was said, where it was said, and how it was said." Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216.
43. ld.at1217.
44. !d.
45. !d. at 1220. Justice Alito wrote a passionate dissent, labeling the speech at issue a
"vicious verbal assault." !d. at 1222 (Aiito, J., dissenting). The First Amendment, wrote Alito, gave
the speakers "almost limitless opportunities" to voice their opinions on "moral, religious, and
political issues," but did not extend a license to exploit the funeral of a private citizen to attract
public attention. !d.
46. Fox!, 556 U.S. 502 (2009). A week after this decision, the Court declined review of CBS
Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), in which the Third Circuit held that the FCC had
improperly fined CBS for the "wardrobe stunt" that briefly exposed Janet Jackson's nipple during
the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show. !d. at 209.
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Court in 2009 and 2012, had the potential to upend the FCC's entire
regime of broadcast indecency regulation, but the Court twice dodged
addressing the First Amendment dimension of the case, leaving intact
"medium-specific" First Amendment doctrines applicable only to
broadcasters. 47 In both Fox I and Fox II, the Court went to great lengths
to avoid First Amendment issues, deciding Fox I narrowly on
administrative law grounds 48 and Fox II narrowly on due process
grounds. 49 Nonetheless, the cases indicate that at least two Justices are
ready to apply the same exacting scrutiny to content-based restrictions on
broadcasters as they apply to other speakers, thus signaling that FCC's
days policing indecency on the airwaves may be numbered.
To understand why the Fox cases involved a missed First
Amendment opportunity, one must understand certain background
developments. In 1978, the Supreme Court held in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation 50 that the First Amendment did not bar the FCC from
regulating indecency in broadcasting, 51 even though content-based
regulation of indecency in other media would surely be unconstitutional.
Pacifica allowed the government to regulate broadcast indecency due to
the distinctive characteristics of the broadcast medium, including its
"pervasiveness" and accessibility to children. 52

47. See generally Fox fl. 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012); Fox I, 556 U.S. 502.
48. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 522.
49. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
50. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 ( 1978).
51. !d. at 741. The statutory authority for the FCC's regulation of indecency is Title 18 of the
U.S. Code, which makes it unlawful to utter "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means
of radio communication." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012). The FCC enforces this provision primarily
through forfeitures but also has authority to enforce it through license revocation. 47 U.S.C. §
312(a)(6)
52. Although the Court also cited spectrum scarcity as a justification for treating broadcasters
differently than other media in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731, the Roberts Court cited only pervasiveness
and accessibility to children as Pacifica's rationales for giving broadcasters "the most limited First
Amendment protection." Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2312 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Red Uon Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969), the Supreme
Court focused on spectrum scarcity as the primary rationale for applying a different First
Amendment standard to broadcasters and concluded that the government may require a broadcaster
to act as a "fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of
his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." Some have
also cited the intrusiveness, power, and vividness of the broadcast medium as well as "public
ownership" of the airwaves as justifications "for treating broadcast media differently than print
media." See MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRISSA LIUSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW;
CASES AND MATERIALS 82-83 (7th ed. 2005) (listing justifications).
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In 1987, the FCC began actively applying a "context-based
approach" to indecency regulation and signaled that "isolated" instances
of nudity or use of profanity would be less likely to gamer sanctions than
"repeated broadcasts of indecent material." 53 A 2001 FCC Order54
reinforced that "fleeting" instances of indecent language were unlikely to
generate a "finding of indecency," although the Order gave examples of
fleeting language that might be indecent when combined with other
factors.
The FCC's approach to isolated instances of expletives or nudity
appeared to change course abruptly in 2003, when the agency issued an
Order that held, in a case involving the unscripted use of the "F-Word"
during live telecast of the Golden Globe Awards, 55 that "the mere fact
that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does not
mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the
broadcast medium is not indecent." 56 The FCC subsequently "applied its
new policy to fleeting expletives and fleeting nudity" that had aired on
Fox and ABC, 57 respectively, prior to issuance of the Order. 58 Fox and
other interveners first appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009
contending, among other arguments, that technological changes had
eliminated the justification for applying "medium-specific" First
53. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2313. In 1995, the FCC modified its indecency regulations to
prohibit broadcasting of indecent material between 6:00 a.m. and I 0:00 p.m. Restrictions on the
Transmission of Obscene and Indecent Material, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,439 (Aug. 28, 1995) (codified at
47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2012)).
54. Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC Red. 7999, 8008 (Apr. 6, 2001),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2001/fccOI090.html. The Order clarified that in
determining whether a broadcast is indecent, the FCC looks first to its subject matter and whether it
describes or depicts sexual or excretory organs or activities; next, the FCC determines if the
broadcast is patently offensive when measured by contemporary community standards. !d. at 8002.
Context is important in determining offensiveness, and three factors are highly significant: the
explicitness or graphic nature of the material; whether it "dwells on or repeats at length descriptions
of sexual or excretory organs or activities"; and whether its nature is pandering or titillating. !d. at
8003.
55. The musician Bono exclaimed: 'This is really, really, fucking brilliant. Really, really
great," after his band U2 received an award for best original song. Gene Policinski, Justices Set to
Review Broadcast-Indecency Rules, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jun. 27, 2011),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justices-set-to-review-broadcast-indecency-rules.
56. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden
Globe Awards" Program, 19 FCC Red. 4975, 4980 (2004 ).
57. Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 25, 2003
Broad. of the Program "NYPD Blue", 23 FCC Red. 3147 (2008).
58. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2315.
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Amendment doctrines to broadcasters. 59 The Court, however, rejected
the invitation to address the First Amendment issues and held merely that
the FCC's change of policy toward fleeting expletives was not arbitrary
and capricious as a matter of administrative law. 60 On remand, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down the entirety of the
FCC's indecency policy on First Amendment grounds and subsequently
vacated a forfeiture order against ABC for airing fleeting nudity on
NYPD Blue. 61
When the FCC appealed, the Supreme Court once again dodged the
First Amendment issue, this time deciding that the FCC's sudden change
in the way it interpreted its statutory mandate to police broadcast
indecency violated the broadcasters' due process rights. 62 Specifically,
the Court found that the new indecency policy was unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Fox and ABC because they did not have "fair notice"
that airing "a fleeting expletive or a brief shot of nudity" 63 would subject
them to sanctions. In light of the due process violation, the Court found it
"unnecessary to reconsider Pacifica at this time." 64 Although both
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in
the judgment, they would have overturned Pacifica, 65 with Justice
Ginsburg writing that it "was wrong when it issued" and should now be
overturned in light of "[t]ime, technological advances, and the
Commission's untenable rulings in the cases now before the Court." 66
Why did the Court forego the opportunity to revisit whether
broadcasters receive less First Amendment protection from contentbased regulation than other media? Some commentators have speculated
that Justice Sonia Sotomayor's recusal may have left the Court split 4--4
on whether to overturn Pacifica, 67 and the Court ruled narrowly to avoid

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
should be
66.
67.

Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009).

!d. at 520.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317,335 (2d Cir. 2010).
Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
/d.at2318.
!d. at 2320.
/d. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Thomas had already signaled that Pacifica
overturned in Fox I. See Fox I, 556 U.S. at 530 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See Joe Flint and David Savage, Justices Decline To Address Bid To Overturn FCC
Indecency Rules, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/22/business /la-fict-court-indecency-20120622; Eugene Volokh, FCC v. Fox Television Decided Narrowly on Lackof-Fair-Notice
Grounds,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(June
21,
2012,
II :31
AM),
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issuing an opmwn that would not bring unanimity or clarity. 68
Regardless, the Court's narrow decision leaves the FCC free to regulate
indecency as long as its policy for doing so provides constitutionally
sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct. Indeed, after the Court issued
its ruling, commissioners of the FCC announced that they would
continue to regulate broadcast indecency within the First Amendment
parameters announced by the Court. 69 Whether this means the FCC will
modify its policy in an attempt to bring clarity to this inherently murky
realm or simply revert to its prior policy of ignoring fleeting expletives
or nudity is unclear. What does seem clear is that future First
Amendment challenges are certain, no matter what the FCC decides.
VI. HOSTILITY TO THE FOURTH ESTATE

Probably the most important First Amendment case decided in the
last decade was the Court's 5-4 decision in Citizens United v. FEC. 70
There, the Roberts Court held, among other things, that the government
may not prevent corporations or unions from making independent
political expenditures for "electioneering communications"-a term
which includes advertisements criticizing or praising candidates for
federal elective office. 71 Citizens United is best known for unleashing
corporate spending during elections. From a media perspective, however,
the decision is a mixed bag.

http://www.volokh.com/20 12/06/21/fcc-v-fox-television-decided-narrowly-on-lack-of-fair-noticegrounds (speculating that Justices Ginsburg, Thomas, Kennedy, and Kagan might have favored
overruling Pacifica and that Justices Scalia, AI ito, Breyer, and Roberts favored upholding it).
68. Although rare, 4-4 split ties can occur when Justices recuse themselves from time to
time. When a 4-4 deadlock does occur, the case is not deemed to have set any sort of precedent; the
Court simply announces that the Court is evenly divided and affirms the lower court decision that is
under review. The decision has no precedentia1 value; the affirmance is issued to afford finality for
the litigants in that particular case. In the event of such a tie, the Court typically issues what is
known as a per curiam decision. The opinion in such a decision is issued under the Court's name, as
opposed to consisting of a majority and a minority opinion. See, e.g., Comment, Supreme Court NoClear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 ( 1956) (analyzing various
types of no-clear-majority decisions and considering their treatment by subsequent courts).
69. See, e.g., Kristen Rasmussen, Fox "Fleeting Expletives" Decision Does Little to Clear
the Air in Regulation of Indecency, NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 2012, available at
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-Iaw/news-mcdia-and-law-summer20 12/fox -%E2%80%9Ctleeting-exp letives%E2%80'%9D-d.
70. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
71. !d. at 898. The Supreme Court in Citizens United overruled portions of McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin v. Michigan Chamber (){Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 ( 1990).
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On one hand, the majority in Citizens United is firmly committed to
First Amendment libertarianism: the decision manifests a profound
mistrust of government interference in the marketplace of ideas produced
by private ordering. 72 The majority opinion attacked the underlying
premise of most campaign finance reform legislation, including the
legislation it struck down. Specifically, the Court disputed the premise
that vast aggregations of wealth in the marketplace of ideas might distort
the marketplace of ideas during federal elections. 73 The Court conceded
that corporations and unions can transform economic power into political
power, but it rejected this as a justification for government regulation of
speech. It explained that such inequalities are inevitable, 74 and the
government's attempt to "level" the power differential among speakers is
dangerous. The public, not the government, has a "right and privilege to
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration" 75 and to "judge what is true and what is false." 76 The
libertarianism of Citizens United will often benefit media interests, at
least to the extent it restrains government regulation of unpopular speech
or speakers. Yet the Court's strong commitment to laissez faire in the
marketplace of ideas has the potential to thwart media interests in cases
in which they request government assistance to perform their
constitutionally assigned roles, such as when they seek access to prisons,
battlefields, or other government controlled places or information.
More worrisome from a media perspective are the extensive dicta in
Citizens United suggesting that a majority of the Justices on the Roberts
Court are deeply suspicious of the claim that the media play a special

72. "Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which
may be a means to control content." Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882-83. This faith in the
marketplace of ideas produced by private ordering is also seen in New York State Board ofE/ections
v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (political parties), and Davis v. Federal Election Commission,
554 U.S. 724 (2008) (wealthy individuals).
73. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904-05 (rejecting the "antidistortion rationale" underlying
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and stating that "political speech cannot be limited based on a
speaker's wealth").
74. /d. at 905 ("All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from
the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting
speech .... ").
75. /d. at 899.
76. /d. at 907. From this standpoint, the attempt to regulate corporate and union political
speech is an "unprecedented" attempt by a government censor, the Federal Election Commission, "to
select what political speech is safe for public consumption by applying ambiguous tests." /d. at 896.
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constitutional role in our democracy. This deep suspicion, even hostility,
to the media's role as the "Fourth Estate" gives cause for concern that
future decisions might erode the few "special rights" the media currently
enjoy. 77 The majority in Citizens United justified their controversial
decision to allow corporations to engage in electioneering partly by
analogizing them to media corporations. After all, reasoned the Court,
"media corporations" may distort political discourse, and "[t]here is no
precedent" 78 permitting the Government to regulate them on this basis.
Moreover, the Court found no basis for treating media corporations
differently than non-media corporations: the "institutional press" has no
"constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers." 79 The Court
further contended that the argument for special constitutional rights for
the institutional press was particularly problematic because "the advent
of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media" had blurred
"the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political
and social issues." 80
Despite noting the "decline of print and broadcast media," the
Citizens United majority emphasized that media corporations are
powerful institutions wielding strong influence in society, particularly

77. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme Court gave
both the public and press a right to attend criminal trials, but the Court suggested that where seating
was limited, the press should be given preference due to its role as surrogate for the public. In
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court refused to extend special rights to the press not
available to other citizens; however, the mere fact that the Court addressed the reporter's claims of
testimonial privilege testifies to the strength of the argument that the Press Clause gives reporters
newsgathering rights not provided by the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Had the same
claim been made by the average citizen, there is no doubt that it would have been summarily
dismissed, instead of splitting the Supreme Court 5-4 as it did in Branzburg. Moreover, the majority
opinion grudgingly yet explicitly acknowledged that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections," id. at 707, and "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated," id. at 681. This acknowledgement, of course, conflicts
with the Court's statement that the press receives no special immunity from the application of
general laws. If newsgathering receives some degree of First Amendment protection, it also
presumably must provide some immunity from generally applicable laws. Neither in Branzburg nor
subsequent decisions does the Court give content to the newsgathering right. Nonetheless,
Branzburg's acknowledgement that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemination at least
hints that at some future point, the government might so encroach upon newsgathering rights that the
Press Clause might be implicated.
78. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905.
79. Jd. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
80. !d. at 905-06.
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during political campaigns. 81 Like non-media corporations, "media
corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the corporate form, the
largest media corporations have 'immense aggregations of wealth,' and
the views expressed by media corporations often 'have little or no
correlation to the public's support' for those views." 82 In other words,
media corporations are elitist, wield political power and influence
disproportionate to their public support, and are no more deserving of
"special" protection than any other corporation.
In fact, the Court suggests that because "television networks and
major newspapers owned by media corporations have become the most
important means of mass communication in modem times," 83 they run
the risk of distorting public discourse and electoral outcomes even more
than non-media corporations. 84 In the Court's view, powerful media
corporations have the potential not only to "distort" electoral outcomes
but to distort them in ways that favor their corporate parents. 85
The Citizens United majority appears to view the "press" or "media"
as comprised primarily of powerful corporate conglomerates whose chief
mission is seeking profit through manipulation of the political process;
these media conglomerates, in tum, preside over a "24-hour news
cycle" 86 that is "dominate[d]" by "sound bites, talking points, and
scripted messages." 87 The majority makes no mention of the role of the
press in informing voters about candidates for elective office, apparently
ignoring Justice Stevens's dissenting argument that "[t]he press plays a
unique role not only in the text, history, and structure of the First
Amendment but also in facilitating public discourse. " 88 In effect, the
majority treats the differences between media and non-media
corporations as nonexistent: hence, both are entitled to pursue their
economic interests through the political process. With this step, the Court
seems to have gone beyond a "pragmatic view" of the press to a
81. Jd.
82. !d. at 905 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).

83. !d.
84. !d. at 906.
85. Jd.
86. Id. at 912.
87. !d.
88. Id. at 976 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice Stevens's
opinion Uoined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor), the history and text of the First
Amendment "suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be able to
claim special First Amendment status." Jd. at 951 n.57.
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profound cynicism about the Fourth Estate. A majority on the Roberts
Court apparently believes that the press as an institution can and must
seek privileges through the political process; the Court, however,
apparently sees no relevant differences between media corporations like
NBC and non-media corporations like Wal-Mart: both peddle their wares
to the public motivated solely by profit. Indeed, at times the Court's
descriptions of the media seem to go beyond skeptical to antagonistic.
Though Citizens United is not a press case, it certainly gives little cause
for hope to those who argue that the First Amendment gives distinctive
rights to the media under the Press Clause. 89
VII. CONCLUSION

This essay is modeled on Erwin Chemerinsky's 2011 published
lecture entitled Not a Free Speech Court, in which Professor
Chemerinsky attempted to gauge the Roberts Court's commitment to free
speech protection from its decided cases. 90 This essay attempts to gauge
the Court's commitment to press freedom, despite the paucity of press
cases before the Court. Whereas Professor Chemerinsky based his
predictions about the Court on decided free speech cases, this essay has
been left to extrapolate how media litigants might fare before the Court
from its strong commitment to First Amendment libertarianism in speech
cases, its refusal to extend "medium-specific" First Amendment
doctrines to video games in the single "press" case it has decided, its
decision to twice dodge the issue of whether broadcast indecency
regulation remains constitutional, and its dicta in its most famous free
speech cases evincing hostility to the recognition of special rights for the
media under the First Amendment's Press Clause. With such scant
evidence, any predictions about the Roberts Court's likely path in "press
cases" must be circumspect. Nonetheless, it seems safe to predict that
this Court is unlikely to grant access rights or privileges more extensive
than those the media presently enjoys. This Court also is unlikely to draw
constitutional distinctions that give new media fewer First Amendment
rights than old media enjoy, and media litigants should not expect a

89. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Reawakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 104344 (20 II) (arguing for the Supreme Court to recognize that the First Amendment gives the
institutional press rights not available to other speakers, such as a privilege to protect the identity of
confidential sources).
90. See Chemerinsky, supra note 7.
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warm reception for the argument that the Press Clause provides rights
not already protected by the Speech Clause. 91 Viewed from this
perspective, the paucity of press cases decided by the Roberts Court does
not look so bad.

91.

See Seth Konnan, Citizens United and the Press: Two Distinct Implications, 37
L RFc. I, 2-1 (2010) ("[B]y affording all corporations the same rights as those granted
the media, the decision at the same time seems to further enfeeble the Press Clause .... ").
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